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Abstract

In complex procurement projects, it is difficult to write enforceable contracts that
condition price upon quality. Supplier non-performance becomes an acute risk,
particularly when there is intense competition for the contract. An established
incentive mechanism used to mitigate the problem of supplier non-performance is
retainage, in which the buyer sets aside a portion of the purchase price. After project
completion, the buyer determines the amount of retainage that is released to the
seller, considering any defects that arise. While generally a feasible contract form to
implement, the practical difficulties in assessing completion introduce a moral
hazard for the buyer. We develop a structurally new game and experimental design
to offer managerial insights on how retainage principles mediate trust and
trustworthiness in competitive procurement settings with moral hazard. The
experimental results suggest that if trust in the procurement relationship is strong
enough, then retainage can mitigate the seller-side moral hazard problem and
substitute for reputation in a fragmented supply chain, at the cost of inflated tender
prices. In high retainage structures, there is a trade-off between trade efficiency and
supplier participation in request for bids. We further develop a model of fair payment
norms and offer managerial insights on how to design the retainage mechanism,
conditional on prevailing levels of trust and beliefs about fairness.
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1. Introduction
A tension between competition and cooperation characterizes many procurement settings. It is

common practice for public and private sector entities to rely on competitive procurement to
obtain goods and deliver projects. 1 For standardized goods, price competition promotes

productive efficiency and cost reduction by suppliers. For non-standardized goods, such as

complex construction or infrastructure projects, the benefits of competition are less

straightforward. A distinguishing feature of procurement tenders, as opposed to sales auctions,
is that the bidding process represents the beginning rather than the end of the relationship

(Fugger, Gretschko and Pollrich 2019). Procurers often rely on ex-post incentives to mitigate the
risk of supplier non-performance. 2 It can be difficult, however, for the procurer to write complete

and enforceable agreements ex-ante that condition price on the quality of works delivered
(Chakravarty and MacLeod 2009, Gretschko and Pollrich 2019). Supplier cost-cutting is an ever-

present issue (Lo et al. 2007, Midler 2007). This may manifest itself in reduced quality materials

or unethical/unsustainable production processes (Guo et al. 2015, Chen and Lee 2016). Intense
competition for the contract may further increase suppliers’ incentives to cut corners later on

(Chaturvedi 2021), or adversely affect relationship-building (Emiliani and Stec 2005).

An understudied incentive mechanism used in procurement to mitigate supplier moral

hazard issues is retainage. A retainage provision, or retention as it is known outside the United
States, is a pre-agreed percentage of the contractual price withheld from a seller by the buyer.

The buyer in this context might be a client, main contractor or sub-contractor withholding money
from a lower tier. Retainage has its origins in nineteenth-century British railway construction,

when it was set at 20% of contractual value (Bausman 2004). Today, typical provisions range
from 3 to 10% and provisions are found across most standard construction contract types (Cox

et al. 2011, Nabi Mohamad et al. 2021). 3 On substantial completion of the project, retainage is
released back to the seller, minus deductions for any defects that arise. Measures to safeguard

cash retainage vary by country and locale. 4

1 The World Bank estimates that on average, public procurement constitutes 14.5% of gross domestic
product globally (Djankov et al. 2017).
2 See, e.g., Bajari et al. (2014) in highway procurement. An alternative mechanism to overcome the tension
between competition and cooperation in procurement is proposed by Chakraborty et al. (2021). In a mixed
adverse selection and moral hazard model, they show that incentives to mitigate shirking by sellers can be
provided either by limiting the number of bidders, or by using an inefficient auction allocation rule.
3 In the UK, standard building contracts are produced by the Joint Contracts Tribunal, which encourages
the holding of retention monies until practical completion. In the US, standard Design-Build agreements
include those produced by the American Institute of Architects, ConsensusDocs and the Engineers Joint
Contract Documents Committee. These contracts often specify that half of the retainage money be released
immediately, while the remainder is released after the expiration of a defects liability period.
4 The European Commission (2009, clause 41) prescribes that retainage monies “are not paid until the
satisfaction of conditions specified in the contract for the payment of such amounts or until defects have
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In this paper, we develop a structurally new game and experimental design to offer

managerial insights on how retainage principles mediate trust and trustworthiness in
procurement settings with moral hazard. 5 Specifically, we investigate how and when contractual

retainage can be used to mitigate the seller moral hazard problem in a two-tier supply chain. If

operating as intended, retainage circumvents the difficulties in writing a complete contract and
effectively aligns project incentives (Raina and Tookey 2013). An alternative view cited among

practitioners is that retainage negatively impacts contractors’ cashflow, thereby acting as a

financial constraint and generating a counter-productive increase in procurement costs.
Recognition of a potential hidden cost of retainage has driven a downward trend in the maximum

retainage provision permitted by several US states (ASA 2018). The efficiency of using retainage

to mitigate moral hazard is understudied and is challenging to measure using empirical data due

to the nuances and complexity of each construction project. The laboratory enables us to isolate
the causal effect of retainage on bids, quality and profits, without the confounds of project-specific

factors or alternative mechanisms (e.g., repeated interactions) observed in the real world.

An important consideration in the implementation of retainage is what, in practice,

constitutes substantial completion. Legal scholars have long recognized the difficulties inherent
in determining such a doctrine (Thomas et al. 1995). 6 Failure of trade parties to understand their

contractual obligations is one of the leading causes of construction disputes (Arcadis 2020).

Litigation is often lengthy to pursue. A costly dispute between the Californian construction

contractor, FTR, and the client Rio School District, over the latter’s failure to release more than
half a million dollars of retainage persisted for many years before being resolved to FTR’s favor
in 2015. 7 Recently, a construction sector consultation commissioned by the UK Department of

Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (Pye Tait 2017) found that late and non-payment of

retainage monies from clients to contractors is commonplace, especially among lower tier
suppliers. Whether or not the withholding of retainage monies is justified is often unclear,

precisely because of the difficulties in verifying substantial performance. 8 What is clear from the

report is that a substantial fraction of clients believe their overall project costs are higher because
been rectified.” In New Zealand, the 2015 Construction Contracts Amendment Bill provides additional
protection for the payment of retainage monies to sub-contractors. In China, retainage applies to prespecified defects liability periods and at the time of writing enjoy additional financial guarantees from the
Agricultural Bank of China.
5 We take inspiration from Özer and Zheng (2019), who argue that “developing structurally new games and
experimental design … are necessary to better understand the role of trust and trustworthiness in decisionmaking because they are not abstract issues” (Section 14.4).
6 Corbin (1919) captured the essence over a century ago: “What constitutes substantial performance must
be determined with reference to the particular facts in each case. The question is always one of degree and
its solution must be doubtful in many cases” (p 761).
7 FTR International, Inc. v. Rio School District. California Court of Appeal, 2015.
8 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us clarify on this point.
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of retainage, that retainage induces the possibility of opportunistic payment behavior and that
tender prices reflect this countervailing buyer moral hazard.

The buyer moral hazard problem is accentuated when suppliers make relation-specific

investments before a contract is confirmed. In 2016, German automaker Volkswagen (VW)
cancelled orders worth 500 million euros with two component suppliers, in the wake of the

emissions scandal that forced the company to cut approximately 1 billion euros in costs. The
cancellation came too late for the suppliers, however, who had already spent 58 million euros
making factory alterations in preparation for the order (Rauwald 2016).

Similar situations can arise in the construction industry. One example is when a project

proceeds based on a letter of intent (LOI). There are various types of LOI, from a “handshake”

agreement stating the intention of parties to trade, to an interim contract which is replaced by a

binding contract on expiration. The peril of supplying under an LOI, without a concrete payment

schedule, is demonstrated by a notable English contract law case. 9 In 2005, RTS Systems won a

competitive tender to supply improved food packaging for the German dairy manufacturer Müller.
Work began based on an LOI and Müller paid RTS only 30% of the agreed price up front and a

further 40% later on. After expiration of the LOI and repeated deferral in the execution of a
binding contract, Müller alleged product defects and refused to pay RTS the remaining 30% of the

tender price. A protracted and costly legal battle ensued, centered around the basis for which a
contractual agreement existed. The Supreme Court Justice pronounced on judgement day that
“the moral of the story is to agree first and to start work later”.

Today, the use of LOIs “remains widespread in the construction industry” (Wevill 2015, p

29). The buyer, while not explicitly designating withheld monies as retainage, may withhold a

high percentage of the purchase price up front. And while a well-written LOI should allocate

reasonable cost estimates for all items to avoid unprotected investments, this is not a legally
binding agreement and payment is normally on a quantum meruit basis, which can lead to dispute

over monies owed (Chappell 2021, p 9). 10 It is not difficult to specify cost structures which expose

suppliers to losses and potentially deter participation in requests for bids.

Motivated by the anecdotal evidence, we vary the percentage of the contract price

withheld by the buyer until after delivery of the project to shift the relative burdens of trust

between buyer and seller. To that end, we compare the performance of procurement contracts in
which there is either (i) zero retainage – a fixed-price contract, (ii) a retainage provision set such

that suppliers can adjust their bid upwards to compensate for the increased risk of non-payment
of monies, or (iii) high retainage in which the buyer pays only a small percentage of the contract

9

RTS Flexible Systems Limited v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH [2010] 14 UKSC.
See, e.g., EWHC 687 (TCC), [2006] CILL 2348 and BLM Vol.23 No.6.

10
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price up front, and consequently suppliers cannot fully compensate for future production costs

incurred by bidding higher. These three arrangements approximate the market conditions

(rather than specific parameters) discussed above. That is, there is either a one-sided seller moral

hazard problem, a two-sided buyer and seller moral hazard problem, or a one-sided buyer moral
hazard problem.

We develop an analytical model that consists of a sealed-bid reverse auction (tender)

followed by a bilateral trade interaction. Specifically, a single buyer seeks to procure one unit of

an indivisible good (e.g., construction of a new school) from a pool of pre-qualified suppliers.

There is a commitment to procure at the lowest price, if at all, and the contract contains a fixed
retainage provision. After allocation of the contract, the seller takes costly action to deliver the

project and the buyer realizes the project value as a function of the seller’s action. The buyer then
has discretion over the retainage return decision. In other words, the buyer decides how to
allocate retainage monies to compensate the seller for performance delivered.

The retainage-related part of the transaction is predicated on trust, and so game-theoretic

arguments based on standard preferences predict that the retainage mechanism generates no
quality improvement. Trust between agents (i.e., managers) is an important driver of supply

chain success (Cerić 2016). Thus, we develop a model of fair payment norms, in which the buyer

may be trustworthy or untrustworthy. We adopt Özer and Zheng’s (2019, p 497) definition of

trustworthiness as a voluntary behavior “in a way not to take advantage of the trustor’s

vulnerable position when faced with a self-serving decision that conflicts with the trustor’s
objective”. Whereas an untrustworthy buyer always withholds retainage from the seller, a

trustworthy buyer distributes retainage according to some known and exogenous fairness norm.
Trust is defined as the seller’s belief about interacting with a trustworthy buyer (Herold 2010).

Standard preferences imply that trade efficiency will be low in our first two contracting

arrangements, because of the seller moral hazard problem, and nil in our third contracting

arrangement, as the market unravels. By contrast, the model of fair payment norms demonstrates
that, if there exists sufficient trust in the market, then high quality delivery emerges as an
equilibrium outcome in anticipation of a positive reciprocal retainage return. Designed

appropriately and under sufficient conditions of trust, retainage can be used to mitigate the seller
moral hazard problem. We fit our behavioral model to the data and provide a characterization of
the optimal retainage level, given beliefs about the fair reference point in the transaction. By doing
so, we contribute to a growing behavioral operations literature addressing how social

4

preferences influence supply chain contracting (Beer et al. 2018, Cui et al. 2007, Davis and
Hyndman 2018, Hu et al. 2017, Katok and Pavlov 2013, Loch and Wu 2008). 11

Our experimental data offer two primary insights for practitioners in construction and

related procurement settings: (i) if trust in the supply chain relationship is strong enough, then
retainage is a useful mechanism to mitigate the seller moral hazard problem and substitute for

reputation in a fragmented supply chain; (ii) if there exists a subset of untrustworthy buyers in
the population, then retainage is liable to inflate tender prices and high retainage structures to

deter participation in the contracting process. Specifically, suppliers may sub-optimally adjust

their bids in anticipation of uncertain retainage returns and incur losses on relationship-specific

investments. 12 Based on these insights, managers and policymakers should consider measures to

facilitate trust in the ex-post procurement relationship during the ex-ante tender process, while
letting the price mechanism efficiently allocate the contract. In the conclusion, we return to
discuss what said measures might look like.

The present study builds on a well-established experimental economics literature

examining trust and trustworthiness in principal-agent settings. Our baseline environment
integrates the gift-exchange game of Fehr et al. (1993) into an auction setting. In a typical giftexchange game, participants are assigned to the role of either buyer or seller and participate in a

two stage exchange. First, the buyer sets a price. Second, the seller produces a costly product
quality and creates the trade surplus. In the absence of reputational considerations, if there is a
preannounced and finite number of repetitions, then the seller should incur the minimum

production cost possible and receive the lowest available price. In contrast, experiments of the

gift exchange game without competition, typically observed a positive relationship between price

and quality, yielding a Pareto improvement relative to the equilibrium prediction and lending

support to Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange hypothesis (Anderhub et al. 2002, Fehr et al. 1997).
Reciprocal behavior can be rationalized with theories of social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels

2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Yet, in price-based auction models where buyers can only transact

with the lowest-priced seller, competition forces bidding down to minimum cost. High quality is
then not a profitable seller strategy. The discontinuity in quality choice as a function of price is a
direct result of the incomplete contracting model (Hart 1995).

In related work, Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) observe in an experiment that renegotiable option contracts
can help solve the hold-up problem if sellers are endowed with bargaining power. A similar framework has
been applied to a supply chain context by Davis and Leider (2018).
12 Related auction models in which contract renegotiation leads to lower prices ex-post are considered by
Waehrer (1995) and Wang (2000). Shachat and Tan (2015) consider an auction-bargaining mechanism in
which sellers compete at an English auction to deliver an indivisible good to a buyer. They find in an
experiment that re-negotiated prices are below the winning bid although, contrary to the Nash prediction,
final and initial prices are positively correlated.
11
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By designing different price-setting institutions, prior studies have shown that it is

possible to improve trade efficiency in auction environments with moral hazard. 13 Most closely

related to this paper are Fugger, Katok and Wambach (2019) and Brosig-Koch and Heinrich

(2014). These studies restrict attention to the nature of the auction selection rule with fixed-price

(i.e., zero retainage) contracts. In a price-based auction, the market is inefficient with low quality

production. Fugger, Katok and Wambach show that simply giving buyers the option to select a

seller who did not place the lowest bid (called a buyer-determined auction) significantly raises
prices and quality levels. Like in our study, interactions are one-shot, no reputation information

is available, and buyers must accept vulnerability to loss to incentivize high quality. The authors

employ a multi-level cost and quality design, across two different valuation schedules. Their

experimental data reveal that buyer-determined auctions yield a robust improvement in

cooperation and efficiency and they rationalize this finding using a model of inequity-averse

preferences. Brosig-Koch and Heinrich consider a buyer-determined auction in which buyers can
condition procurement acceptance decisions on past seller performance. Providing reputation
information in this way significantly increases buyer profits and procurement quality, relative to

the price-based auction format.

Buyer-determined auctions clearly have an important trust-building role in procurement.

They are not, however, always palatable from a regulatory standpoint, not least because they may
facilitate bidder collusion (Fugger et al. 2016) or discrimination in the award decision (Verdeaux

2003). We believe that by understanding how and when an alternative real-world incentive

mechanism can be used to overcome seller-side moral hazard – and its trade-offs with buyer-side
moral hazard – enable us to make a significant contribution on this issue.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline the setting and derive

competing analytical results from the benchmark model and from a model of fair payment norms.

In section 3, we derive testable hypotheses and summarize the experimental design. In section 4,

we present our experiment results and conduct a formal statistical analysis. In section 5, we
estimate the parameters of our behavioral model. In section 6, we conclude by drawing

implications for managerial decision-making and delineate conditions under which the retainage

contract is beneficial in procurement interactions.

The first experimental analysis of procurement contracts in reverse auctions with moral hazard was
conducted by Cox et al. (1996). They compared fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts. Their main finding
was a trade-off between budgetary expense and efficiency. Although contracts with a greater cost-sharing
element involved less procurement expense, they were also less efficient due to heightened seller moral
hazard. Cost-sharing arrangements tend to be more appropriate for complex projects, accompanied by low
degrees of design completeness (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). For the procurement of complex goods, a buyer
commitment to negotiate with one seller can outperform an auction when there is adverse selection, scope
for product improvements and/or costly renegotiation (Herweg and Schmidt 2017).
13

6

2. Model and Theory
Consider a one-shot interaction in which a single buyer seeks to procure one unit of an

indivisible good from a group of 𝑛𝑛 pre-qualified suppliers, indexed by i. A first-price sealed-bid

auction determines selection of the winning supplier (henceforth the seller) and the contract
price. Auction participation is voluntary for suppliers, and the buyer can choose to not purchase

after observing the contract price. The seller can produce either a high- or low-quality unit, but
the setting prohibits quality contingent contracts.

In this setting, the contract price is less binding than usual as purchases are made with

retainage provisions. Such a provision includes a retainage proportion 𝜌𝜌, which is a fraction of
the contract price withheld from the seller until after unit production. 14 A general interpretation

of 𝜌𝜌 is as the degree of price flexibility. After production, the buyer observes her valuation and

(indirectly) the seller’s action. The amount of retainage released to the seller is then at the buyer’s

discretion. The retainage proportion thus regulates each party’s trust burden: at low levels, the

buyer possesses limited insurance against low quality production; at high levels, the seller is
vulnerable to financially damaging retainage return decisions. The sequence of events is

displayed in Figure 1.

In the Bidding Stage, each supplier simultaneously submits his bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , or chooses not to

participate in the auction process. If at least one seller submits a bid, the one submitting the
lowest bid wins the auction and the contract price is the winner’s bid, 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝑏𝑏1 , ⋯ , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 }. Ties

are broken randomly. If no bid is submitted, all parties earn zero and we call this outcome “market
unraveling”. When an auction succeeds, the profile of bidding-stage actions is announced before
the next stage.

In the Procurement Stage, the buyer either accepts the winning bid and pays (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 to

the winner, or she accepts it resulting in all parties earning zero. The buyer’s Procurement Stage
action is 𝑎𝑎 ∈ {𝑎𝑎0 , 𝑎𝑎1 }, where 𝑎𝑎0 is a rejection and 𝑎𝑎1 is an acceptance. A buyer’s agreement to

purchase initiates a fundamental transformation (Williamson 1985), which describes the

transition from an ex-ante competitive market in which multiple suppliers can tender their bid,
to an ex-post bilateral trade relationship between the buyer and seller.

In the Production Stage, the seller chooses to produce either a high- or low-quality unit,

𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 , 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 }. The seller incurs a sunk production cost 𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗 for quality level j. Production cost

schedules are the same across suppliers and this is common knowledge. A seller’s cost of
producing high quality is strictly greater than his cost of producing low quality, 𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 > 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 > 0.

14

For 𝜌𝜌 = 1, the procurement decision can be thought of as a payment promise (uninformative cheap talk).
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Likewise, the buyer’s valuation of the unit is increasing in quality and given by the expression 𝑣𝑣 𝑗𝑗 .
Trade is preferred to no trade and surplus is increasing in quality, i.e., 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0.

Finally, in the Payment Stage, the buyer observes the quality and then selects a proportion,

r, of the retainage money to return to the seller.

Figure 1. The sequence of events in our procurement model.

Notes: This is an extensive game tree representation of the strategic interaction. Suppliers
move first and either submit a bid 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 at auction or choose not to participate. If a market
forms, the buyer can either accept to trade with the lowest bidder and make a guaranteed
payment equal to (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝, or refuse the transaction. The winning supplier (seller) then
selects to produce a high quality, 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 , or low quality, 𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 , product and incurs the production
cost . The buyer is informed about the product value, 𝑣𝑣 𝑗𝑗 , and decides on a discretionary
proportion r of the retainage money 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 to return to the seller. The seller earns a profit equal
to the difference between total payment received and the cost incurred. The buyer earns a
profit equal to the difference between value received and the total payment made. Nontrading parties earn zero profit.

Formally, a supplier i’s strategy has two components. These are a Bidding Stage action

𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∈ {[𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 , 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 ], 𝑏𝑏 0 } and a quality choice function 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝, 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1 ). Bids can be submitted from

a continuous interval between the seller’s minimum production cost and a reserve price, which

without loss we set to equal the buyer’s maximum valuation for the unit, and 𝑏𝑏 0 is nonparticipation. A buyer’s strategy also has two components: a procurement decision function,
𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝); and a retainage return function, 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 | 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1 ).

The profits of the transacting buyer and seller are,
8

Buyer’s profit :

Seller’s profit :

Π𝐵𝐵 = 𝑣𝑣 𝑗𝑗 − (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌

Π𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 + 𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗

Our primary interest is in whether and under what conditions there exists an equilibrium

solution that implements high quality. High quality is implementable if it yields a non-negative

expected payoff to the transacting parties (buyer and seller participate voluntarily) and it is

incentive compatible (preferred to low quality by the seller).
2.1

Discussion of model assumptions

Before proceeding to the analysis, we provide justification for the assumptions underlying

our procurement model. The model assumes: 1. a tender with multiple pre-qualified potential
suppliers; 2. a discretionary purchase; 3. a non-recurring transaction; 4. a project for which it is

difficult to condition price on quality; 5. a contract with retainage provision. We argue that the

combination of these five assumptions strikes a reasonable balance between replicating the

target setting of interest and controlling for factors that may otherwise confound the retainage

channel of interest. To justify the combination of our assumptions, rather than each assumption
in isolation, we consider qualitative evidence from a single locale, the UK construction sector,

based on procurement regulations, impact assessments and practitioner guides (Table 1). We
discuss the generalizability of our results further in the conclusion.

First, note that the use of pre-qualification questionnaires to short-list capable suppliers

before the tender process is commonplace in construction and subject to regulatory mandate for
large public-sector projects. Pre-qualification saves time and identifies potential tenderers who

are appropriate to carry out the project. Second, most tenders include discretionary clauses that

allow the buyer to reject all bids. While such provisions may also extend to the possibility of
accepting the non-lowest bid (buyer-determined auction), this assumes that suppliers can be
differentiated based on quality ex-ante. This is not the case in our model and so allowing for such

a choice would confound the channel of interest by allowing price to function as a signal of quality,
engendering trust that may mistakenly be attributed to the retainage mechanism (see Fugger,
Katok and Wambach 2019).

Third, anecdotal evidence from impact assessments suggests that the construction supply

chain is fragmented and proceeds project to project, with many one-time business relationships.

Although abstracting from reputational information is restrictive from a practical perspective, it

is a strength of the experimental method to control for factors that cannot be well-identified in
field data. Fourth, it is difficult for third parties to verify the quality of outcomes due to the

complexity of construction projects and the subjectivity around performance obligations. Finally,

primary survey data collected by Pye Tait (2017) for the period 2013 to 2016 implies that
9

retainage provisions are contained in many UK construction contracts. While the total value of

retainage held across the sector is uncertain, 75% of contractors and 80% of clients reported

experiencing retainage over the last three years; the percentages of their contracts with retainage

monies held were 65% and 78%, respectively.

Table 1 – Primary evidence to support the combination of model assumptions.
Assumption

UK construction sector evidence base

1. Multiple pre-qualified
potential suppliers.

Pre-qualification questionnaires (PQQs) are mandated for public
sector construction projects above EU thresholds.a, b

3. Non-recurring transaction.

“While there are some examples of large, repeat and expert clients
adopting a genuinely strategic approach to their supply chain, many
of the industry’s customers in the private and public sector are
occasional or contract for a single project. Therefore, it is usually the
case that business-to-business relationships between the client and
the industry, and through the supply chain, are transactional with
decisions taken on an immediate or short term basis.”d

4. Non-verifiability of
outcomes.

“It can be the case that quality is only apparent after construction
work has been completed … it is challenging to measure the extent to
which late or non-payment of retentions is for justifiable reasons.
This is because opinions as to what constitutes ‘justifiable’ or
‘unjustifiable’ can differ depending on the contractor or client
perspective.”e

5. Retainage provision.

Central estimates on retainage held across the construction sector
in England (as of 2016): f

2. Discretionary purchase.

“Most invitations to tender contain a proviso that the employer does
not guarantee to accept the lowest or any tender”.c

•
•
•
•

Suppliers with experience of retainage in last 3 years: 75%.
Suppliers with retainage held on current contracts: 65%.
Buyers with experience of retainage in last 3 years: 85%.
Buyers with retainage held on current contracts: 78%.

Procurement policy note 8/16: Standard Selection Questionnaire (SQ) template.
https:// gov.uk/government/collections/procurement-policy-notes.
b Thresholds laid down by European Public Contracts Directive (2014/24/EU).
c Chappell (2021, p 1).
d UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Impact Assessment BEIS021(C)-16-IM,
par. 4. https://gov.uk/government/consultations/retention-payments-in-the-construction-industry.
e Ibid., paras. 17, 25.
f Ibid., paras. 10, 16. The central estimates are uncertain and rely on several assumptions.
a
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2.2

Standard Theory
In a first approach, we assume that the buyer and sellers are expected profit-maximizers.

We solve for the subgame perfect equilibria (SPNE) using backward induction. 15 All proofs are

contained in the online supplementary materials (available from the authors on request).
Proposition 1.

A. For 𝜌𝜌 ≤ 1 −
𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 0.

𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿
,
𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻

𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿

there is a unique SPNE in which 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = (1−𝜌𝜌) ∀ 𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎 ∗ = 𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 and

𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿

B. For 𝜌𝜌 > 1 − 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻, there is a unique SPNE in which 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑏𝑏 0 ∀ 𝑖𝑖 , and the market unravels;
off the equilibrium path, 𝑎𝑎 ∗ = 𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 and 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 0.

Proposition 1 describes how the retainage proportion regulates the burden of trust

between buyer and seller. Since the buyer always returns zero retainage, the proportion only

influences seller participation and bids. Below a retainage threshold determined by the ratio of a

seller’s minimum production cost to the buyer’s maximum unit valuation, suppliers will
participate in the procurement auction, submit a bid that covers their marginal cost and is

acceptable to the buyer, and produce low quality; the equilibrium bid in this interval is strictly

increasing in the retainage proportion. Above this threshold, no supplier wishes to participate in
the auction process – no available bid at least breaks even – and so the market unravels.

Corollary 1: Under standard preferences, (i) high quality is not an implementable outcome, (ii)
equilibrium bids and the probability of market unraveling are non-decreasing in 𝜌𝜌.
2.3

A Model of Fair Payment Norms

Let us consider an alternative approach in which we depart from standard assumptions

on the buyer’s preferences. The buyer is one of two types: with probability 𝛼𝛼 , the buyer is

trustworthy (𝑇𝑇); with probability (1 − 𝛼𝛼), the buyer is untrustworthy (𝑈𝑈). The prior probability
𝛼𝛼 is common knowledge to all agents. We define trustworthiness with respect to the buyer’s

retainage return for high quality. Whereas both types return zero retainage in exchange for low
quality, only an untrustworthy buyer returns zero retainage for high quality; a trustworthy buyer

can be relied upon to make a fair retainage return for high quality, constrained by the terms of

the contract. That is, whereas low quality unambiguously warrants zero retainage return by both

types, the buyer moral hazard permits subjectivity in what constitutes fair compensation for high

15 Other Nash equilibria exist at higher prices and associated with non-participation, but since none of these
outcomes are compatible with high quality, we ignore them here.
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quality. This permits us to incorporate positive reciprocity into the model. 16 Based on these

definitions, we use the terms “trustworthiness” and “positive reciprocity” interchangeably.

Models of distributional fairness were originally proposed to explain individual behavior

(e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and typically assume that the fair

reference point in a bilateral relationship is the 50-50 surplus split. While this assumption may

be appropriate to describe some firm relationships, not all supply chain relationships are created

equal. Thus, following Cui et al. (2007), we specify that the fair reference point for a trustworthy

buyer is 𝛾𝛾 multiplied by the seller’s profit, or 𝛾𝛾 = Π𝐵𝐵 /Π𝑆𝑆 . 17 Production costs are included in profit
comparisons, based on prior evidence from hold-up experiments that buyers consider sunk costs

when making decisions on final surplus divisions (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004). The

parameter 𝛾𝛾 is exogenous and represents an implicit fairness norm, which in practice may be

specific to the industry, locale or transaction.

There are some notable special cases in this model of fair payment norms. The standard

theory is captured by 𝛼𝛼 = 0. When 𝜌𝜌 = 0, the model collapses to an extensive-form game of
complete information and Proposition 1A applies. In fixed-price contracts, high quality is never

an implementable outcome regardless of the degree of trust. From now on we assume that there

is price flexibility (𝜌𝜌 > 0) and some probability that the buyer is trustworthy (𝛼𝛼 > 0). The model

can then be analyzed as an extensive-form game of incomplete information. We apply a perfect

Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) solution concept and restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria.
This requires that beliefs correspond to the objective probabilities for all equilibrium actions.

Suppose again that suppliers compete anonymously in the Bidding Stage and that in the

Procurement Stage, the buyer accepts any bid from which she expects to profit. After the

fundamental transformation takes place, the seller is uncertain as to the probability with which

the buyer is trustworthy. Trust is defined in our setup as the seller’s belief 𝛼𝛼 about interacting

with a trustworthy buyer. There is a direct mapping between trust beliefs and the seller’s choice

to produce high quality. Our approach enables the characterization of threshold trust levels at
which high quality may emerge at the population level. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide a
similar application of their ERC theory (“the 𝛼𝛼 model”) to data from gift-exchange experiments. 18

The model generalizes to the case in which low quality is also rewarded by trustworthy types. We find
little evidence to support this assumption in our experiment. The alternate specification introduces a nonmonotonicity into the relationship between trust and the incentive compatibility of high quality, which we
return to below.
17 Note that whereas Cui et al. (2007) model disadvantageous inequality aversion, our paper predominantly
models advantageous inequality aversion due to the market imbalance.
18 Bolton and Ockenfels succinctly explain the rationale for such an approach as follows: “much of what we
need to know has to do with the thresholds at which behavior deviates from the ‘more money is preferred
to less’ assumption” (p 167).
16
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In the Payment Stage, the buyer returns zero retainage with probability at least (1 − 𝛼𝛼).

An untrustworthy buyer will always return zero (𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈 = 0). A trustworthy buyer also returns zero

on receipt of low quality. If the seller delivers high quality, then a trustworthy buyer returns the

retainage proportion necessary to achieve a profit distribution as close as possible to the fair

reference point. In this situation, the best-response retainage return function for a trustworthy
buyer is as follows:

𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 ; 𝛾𝛾) =

𝑣𝑣 𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗 + (𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝑝𝑝(1 + 𝛾𝛾)
,
𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌(1 + 𝛾𝛾)

(1)

where the return in (1) is bounded in the unit interval. Thus, conditional on the winning bid, the

optimal return for a trustworthy buyer produces either an interior or corner solution. For ease of
𝑗𝑗

notation, we define 𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 = 𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 𝑗𝑗 ; 𝛾𝛾). The main insights of this section would be unchanged by
assuming that a trustworthy buyer offers a large enough flat reward to the seller for producing

high quality. By introducing a fairness norm into the environment, we consider a variable reward
and provide some foundation as to how this might be determined in practice.

Corollary 2: The trustworthy buyer’s retainage return is (i) non-decreasing in quality, and (ii) nonincreasing in 𝛾𝛾.

In the Production Stage, the seller anticipates the retainage return decision of the buyer

and chooses a quality level 𝑗𝑗 to maximize his expected monetary payoff as follows:
𝑗𝑗

𝐸𝐸[Π𝑆𝑆 ] = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 + 𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 − 𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗 ,

where a seller’s expectation of the retainage return given his quality and bid is driven by his
posterior belief about the buyer’s trustworthiness, with 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 ) = 0 and 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 ) = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 .

Definition 1: The breakeven bid associated with quality level 𝑗𝑗 is 𝑏𝑏 𝑗𝑗 =

𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

.

1−𝜌𝜌(1−𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �)

Intuitively, the higher the seller’s trust and/or the trustworthy buyer’s retainage return, the lower
the bid that a seller can profitably submit. For correct beliefs on 𝛼𝛼, any bid accompanying 𝑞𝑞 𝑗𝑗
below the breakeven level is weakly dominated by a bid equal to 𝑏𝑏 𝑗𝑗 .

Corollary 3: Equilibrium bids and the probability of market unraveling are (i) non-decreasing in 𝜌𝜌,
(ii) non-increasing in 𝛼𝛼, and (iii) non-increasing in 𝛾𝛾.

We can now characterize the conditions under which there exists a PBE associated with

the production of a high quality unit in our environment.
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Proposition 2.
If

𝐴𝐴
1−𝐶𝐶(1−𝐴𝐴)

≤ 𝜌𝜌 ≤

𝐵𝐵
,
𝐶𝐶

𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿

𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻

where 𝐴𝐴 = 1 − 𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 , 𝐵𝐵 = 1 − 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 , 𝐶𝐶 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 , there exists a PBE in pure

strategies in which 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻 ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎 ∗ = 𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 , 𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇∗ = 𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 and 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈∗ = 0.

The proposition states that conditional on the prevailing levels of trust and beliefs about

fairness, the retainage proportion can be set appropriately to incentivize high quality as an

equilibrium strategy and mitigate the seller moral hazard problem. We call this the implementable
retainage interval. The equilibrium bid is 𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻 and so the buyer appropriates all the gains from

trade. The buyer will always find such an outcome profitable and the buyer types will separate in

their final retainage return decision per the discussion above. The two inequalities that define

this interval ensure that 𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻 ∈ [𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 , 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 ] and 𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻 < 𝑏𝑏 𝐿𝐿 . In other words, the breakeven bid associated
with high quality is feasible and below that of low quality.

To understand the bounds on the implementable retainage interval intuitively, note that

𝐴𝐴 is a measure of seller moral hazard, 𝐵𝐵 is a measure of the trade surplus generated by high
quality, and C is a measure of the expected retainage return lost if the seller produces a high

quality unit. As 𝐴𝐴 approaches one from below, the seller has greater cost incentive to produce low

quality. As 𝐵𝐵 approaches one from below, there are greater potential gains from producing a high
quality unit. Conditional on the winning bid, high quality is more difficult to implement using
retainage (i.e., the interval narrows) the larger the seller moral hazard and the smaller the trade

surplus from high quality. Similarly, high quality is easier to implement using retainage the

smaller the associated expected loss of retainage.

Corollary 4: There is a direct and positive correspondence between trust and the size of the
implementable retainage interval.
To demonstrate the trade-offs between bids, participation, and quality, consider an

example. Suppose that 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2 suppliers compete to win a procurement contract, with 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 = 0.30,

𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 = 0.40 , 𝑣𝑣 𝐿𝐿 = 0.35 and 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 = 0.80 (units in tens of thousands). The contract contains a

retainage provision, with 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 or 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 . We will test these parameter values in the
experiment. Figure 2 presents the spectrum of PBE outcomes in the (𝛼𝛼 , 𝛾𝛾) space that are
supported by the model of fair payment norms for each retainage arrangement. Blue circles

(green squares) in the figure indicate beliefs for which the seller delivers low quality (high

quality) as part of the equilibrium bidding strategy. The number inside the shape indicates the

equilibrium bid amount. The empty region in the right panel indicates market unraveling.

In the implementable regions, the equilibrium bid is (weakly) decreasing in 𝛼𝛼 and

increasing in 𝛾𝛾 . Fixing 𝛾𝛾 and moving horizontally from left to right, high quality outcome is
14

implementable above a certain trust threshold. Similarly, fixing 𝛼𝛼 and moving vertically
downwards, high quality is implementable above a certain fairness threshold, provided 𝛼𝛼 is high

enough. The right panel demonstrates that in a high retainage arrangement, the behavioral model
can support high quality in addition to market unraveling as an equilibrium outcome.

Figure 2. Parametric example: equilibrium outcomes supported by the behavioral model.

Notes: The figure displays equilibrium seller bidding strategies in (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾) space for 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5
and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. All computations are based on the following cost and valuation parameter
values: 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 = 0.30, 𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 = 0.40, 𝑣𝑣 𝐿𝐿 = 0.35 and 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 = 0.80. The numbers inside the shapes are
the equilibrium bid amounts associated with the indicated quality level. The empty regions
indicate market unraveling. Due to space constraints, we only consider 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 3. Bids are
discrete with minimum increment 0.01, which reflects the experimental implementation.

At this point, it is worth re-emphasizing that the experimental treatments are intended to

approximate the market conditions (rather than specific parameters) observed anecdotally. That
is, the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 arrangement simulates a two-sided buyer and seller moral hazard problem.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to extend the numerical analysis to incorporate a case of lower
retainage (𝜌𝜌 = 0.1), which is closer to the retainage provisions observed in practice. Note that

what constitutes a “low retainage” provision in our model is defined in relation to the cost and

valuation parameters: from Proposition 2, a necessary condition for the implementability of high

quality is that 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 ⁄𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 ≥ (1 − 𝜌𝜌). Thus, to make this extension interesting, we lower the production
cost differential, while holding constant the total surplus associated with low and high quality.

The main insight is that a lower retainage provision requires a higher trust threshold for high

quality to be implementable. The intuition here is that with less flexibility in the contract price,
there is less scope for a trustworthy buyer to allocate profits in a way that rewards the seller for

delivering high quality. Thus, the probability of any such reward must be large enough to produce
incentive compatibility in expected payoff terms.
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Finally, we remark that if trustworthy buyers were also to reward low quality according

to some – same or different – fairness norm 𝛾𝛾, uncertainty about the buyer’s type (i.e., 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1)
would become a necessary condition to incentivize sellers to deliver high quality. That is, a non-

monotonicity would be introduced into the relationship between trust and the implementable

retainage interval. Above a certain threshold, the high probability of encountering a trustworthy
buyer would allow the seller to submit a low bid and still be insured against loss in case of

producing a low quality unit. In this situation, the lower bound on the implementable retainage
interval becomes 𝐴𝐴/(𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶(1 − 𝐴𝐴)), where 𝐷𝐷 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 is the expected retainage return lost if

the seller produces a low quality unit. From Corollary 2, we have 𝐷𝐷 ≥ 𝐶𝐶, and so this new lower
bound is non-decreasing in 𝛼𝛼 . Therefore, the seller would have an incentive to undercut his

competitor in the Bidding stage and produce low quality (𝑏𝑏 𝐿𝐿 < 𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻 ). This is always the case for

𝛼𝛼 = 1, i.e., when the seller knows that the buyer is trustworthy.
3. Experiment and Hypotheses

3.1

Experimental Design and Procedures
To isolate the effect of contractual retainage on trade outcomes in the absence of

confounds typically observed in the field, we conduct an experiment. In our laboratory setting,

we consider the case of two suppliers. We employed a between-subjects design with three
treatments that varied the retainage provision, 𝜌𝜌 ∈ {0, 0.50, 0.75} (Table 2).

Table 2 – Experimental treatments and parameter values.

Treatment

Retainage Level

2

𝜌𝜌 = 0.50

1
3

Buyer’s valuation
(𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 , 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 )

𝜌𝜌 = 0.00

(35, 80)

𝜌𝜌 = 0.75

Seller’s cost
(𝑞𝑞 𝐿𝐿 , 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 )
(30, 40)

The 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment benchmarks previous experiments for which payment of the

winning bid in full is binding on the buyer, i.e., a fixed-price contract (cf. Auction in Fugger, Katok
and Wambach 2019). The 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment simulates a setting in which suppliers can fully

offset the risk of partial or non-receipt of retainage monies by increasing their bids at auction. By
contrast, in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, there is no bid available at which a supplier can ensure to

avoid a loss during trade. Thus, in this treatment, trade can proceed based on the buyer’s intent
to compensate the seller for costs incurred. We selected values 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 for the
non-zero retainage treatments because they are the easiest retainage provisions for subjects to

comprehend within the appropriate intervals from Proposition 1. The valuation and cost
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parameters associated with high and low quality are also summarized in Table 2. These values
were displayed on the computer screens of all subjects. We restrict bids to be integers.

Subjects were randomly allocated to one of the three treatments and no subject

participated in more than one session. Each treatment included six independent cohorts. There
were three cohorts of the same treatment in every session. Each cohort consisted of three buyers
and six sellers, who were randomly matched across 30 procurement interactions. 19 A bespoke

algorithm guaranteed that no participant in a cohort played with the same pair of individuals in
any two consecutive interactions. A total of 162 human subjects participated in our experiment
sessions, which were conducted at the laboratory of a large public university in the United States.

Participants were students recruited using web-based recruitment software.

All sessions followed the same protocol. Upon arrival, participants were seated at

computer terminals and handed a written copy of the instructions to read in private. Terminals

had physical dividers to prevent subjects from seeing the screens of other participants. The

instructions were played from an audio recording at the front to ensure the description of the
game was common knowledge and delivery consistent across sessions. The task was explained to

subjects using a cover story related to the application of interest and the instructions included

concrete terms such as “Buyer” and “Seller”. This was a deliberate choice to improve subject
understanding (see Cooper and Kagel 2003) and increase external validity (see Katok 2017). 20

Participants completed a computerized test of understanding before being assigned to their role

as a buyer or seller and matched into their first interaction group. Roles remained fixed

throughout. Communication was prohibited and all interactions were anonymous. Own-group

feedback was provided between periods. This information remained available in a history table

to reinforce the game-theoretic assumption of “perfect recall”. At the end of a session, participants

answered a non-incentivized questionnaire to elicit demographic information, attitudes to trust
and risk. The experimental interface was programmed using oTree software (Chen et al. 2016).

Subjects received monetary incentives for their participation. Each subject was paid his

or her summed experiment earnings privately and in cash at the end of a session, in addition to a
$5 show-up fee. Payment was made sequentially, with sufficient time intervals between any two

subjects to mitigate against the possibility of side-payments. We used a symmetric exchange rate

of 20 experiment currency units (ECU) to $1. Average subject earnings were $17.70 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0
treatment, $22.70 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment and $25.00 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment. Sessions

lasted 60 to 75 minutes. Each subject received a non-refundable endowment of 7 ECU per period
We did not inform subjects of the cohort size, to mitigate the possibility of tacit collusion in what might
be considered a small cohort (see Katok 2011 for a discussion).
20 The instructions were framed in neutral language (see Zizzo 2010). We avoided the term “retainage”.
Audio recordings are available on request.
19
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to cover potential losses. Subjects were informed that they would not leave the session with less

than the show-up fee. 21 To reinforce the one-shot nature of interactions, we did not inform
subjects about cumulative earnings until after the final period.
3.2

Hypotheses

Below we outline the hypotheses to be tested in our experiment, based on the standard

theory (ST) and the behavioral model of fair payment norms (BM).

The first two hypotheses relate to the ex-ante competitive market.

Hypothesis 1. Participation. ST and BM both predict that the probability of market unraveling

will be highest in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75; unraveling is an absolute prediction of ST only.

Hypothesis 1 captures the potential anti-competitive effect of a procurement

arrangement in which the seller cannot guarantee to cover future production costs. Market

unraveling is the unique equilibrium prediction under ST. Thus, observing substantial

participation rates in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 would offer support for the relevance of BM. No set of beliefs under
BM can sustain non-participation in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 or 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 and so market unraveling in these
treatments is expected to be negligible.

Hypothesis 2. Prices. ST predicts that prices will be rank ordered 𝑝𝑝𝜌𝜌=0 < 𝑝𝑝𝜌𝜌=0.5 < 𝑝𝑝𝜌𝜌=0.75 ; BM
predicts that bids will be lowest in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.

Hypothesis 2 captures the potential inflationary effect of retainage, as reflected in tender

prices. ST predicts that, conditional on trade, as the retainage proportion increases bidders will

submit higher prices. BM offers no belief-independent comparative static between the non-zero

retainage treatments but does predict that sellers will bid lowest in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.

The final two hypotheses related to the ex-post bilateral trade relationship between the

buyer and seller. We define “trade efficiency” as the proportion of trade surplus realized out of

the total available given the sellers’ bidding decisions. For our parameter values, low (high)

quality corresponds to trade efficiency of 0.125 (1.00).

Hypothesis 3. Trade efficiency. ST predicts no difference in trade efficiency among treatments;
BM predicts that trade efficiency is weakly higher in 𝜌𝜌 > 0 than in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.

In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, limited liability was imposed for two sellers. All results reported below hold if we exclude
these two subjects from our analysis. In a pilot experiment, we tested the most extreme seller trust
arrangement of 100% retainage. Seller losses, however, became a problem. Summary statistics for this
variant are available on request.
21
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Hypothesis 3 addresses the main research question: can retainage be used to mitigate the

moral hazard problem and incentivize high quality? Our analysis suggests that in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 and 𝜌𝜌 =

0.75, high quality is implementable under BM but not under ST. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0, neither model can

rationalize high quality as an equilibrium outcome. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, if we observe trade then BM tells

us that it is most likely to be efficient. The full set of equilibrium seller strategies under BM are
provided in Figure 2. Our measure of trade efficiency does not consider the surplus-reducing
effect of market unraveling. To this end, we construct an additional “global efficiency” measure

defined as the proportion of surplus realized out of total attainable, i.e., if the market always

attracts a bid. To what extent the higher likelihood of market unraveling in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 undermines

global efficiency, relative to the other retainage arrangements, is an empirical question and so we
do not place a formal hypothesis on the trade-off between market unraveling and trade efficiency.
Hypothesis 4. Positive reciprocity. ST predicts that the retainage return will be independent of
quality; BM predicts that the return will be positively correlated with the seller’s quality choice.

Hypothesis 4 considers buyer trustworthiness. Prior economic experiments suggest that

the existence of reciprocity is robust in the laboratory to the imposition of demanding market

institutions (e.g., Fehr and Falk 1999). If a positive correlation is observed between quality and

the retainage return in our experiment, this type of behavior would be consistent only with BM.
4. Experimental Results

We first outline the main aggregate results in relation to our four experimental

hypotheses. We then analyze cohort outcomes over time, to gain greater insight into the market

dynamics. We finish this section with an analysis of data at the individual-level, to better

understand how retainage influences buyer and seller decision-making.

Table 3 summarizes average seller participation rates, prices and quality, along with

buyer acceptance rates and retainage returns. The table also presents summary statistics on
market unraveling, efficiency and profits. 22 Consistent with Hypothesis 1, sellers nearly always

bid in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5. By pairwise comparisons, the percentage of participating bidders is
significantly lower (64%) in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 (both p-values = 0.015). This variable seller participation is

reflected in different rates of market unraveling. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, 22% of auctions fail to attract a
single bidder. By contrast, no market unravels in the lower retainage arrangements.

For each treatment, we have data from 540 matching groups. Since there is no interaction between
subjects playing in different cohorts, each cohort is considered a statistically independent observation. We
employ two-tailed Signed-Rank tests for one-sample comparisons and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for
two-sample comparisons, correcting for multiple testing using Holm’s (1979) p-value adjustment method.
We acknowledge the potential caveat of arbitrary static correlations within sessions (Fréchette, 2012).
22

19

Table 3 – Cohort means and standard deviations.
Panel A: Decision variables
Seller participation
Price
Buyer acceptance
High quality
Retainage return (low)

𝜌𝜌 = 0

𝜌𝜌 = 0.50

𝜌𝜌 = 0.75

0.00
(0.00)
0.11
(0.03)
0.11
(0.03)
2.83
(1.07)
4.43
(1.54)

0.00
(0.00)
0.36
(0.17)
0.36
(0.17)
15.8
(7.65)
-0.25
(1.60)

0.22
(0.26)
0.56
(0.17)
0.46
(0.25)
31.4
(2.49)
-8.75
(5.71)

0.99
(0.01)
35.1
(1.72)
0.60
(0.20)
0.06
(0.02)

0.98
(0.03)
57.8
(5.42)
0.91
(0.08)
0.30
(0.20)
0.06
(0.07)
0.32
(0.16)

Retainage return (high)
Panel B: Market outcomes
Market unraveling
Trade efficiency
Global efficiency
Buyer profit
Seller profit

0.64
(0.26)
57.2
(8.08)
0.98
(0.01)
0.50
(0.19)
0.16
(0.08)
0.40
(0.16)

Notes: Mean (SD) values for the key parameters in our experiment based on cohort averages. Profit
data are per round and exclude the endowment.

Result 1. High retainage structures deter supplier participation in the contracting process.

That sellers in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 still choose to submit a bid in most auctions, despite a high

vulnerability to loss due to uncertain retainage return behavior of the buyer, suggests a role for
trust in the decision-making process. Thus, BM provides a more satisfactory description of sellers’

participation behaviors than ST. Further evidence that the retainage level shifts the burden of

trust in trade relationships away from the buyer can be inferred from buyers’ acceptance

behaviors. The acceptance rates are increasing in the retainage level, from 60% in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 to 91%

in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 and 98% in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75.

Average contract prices are higher in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 (57.8) and in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 (57.2) than in 𝜌𝜌 = 0

(35.1). These pairwise differences versus the zero-retainage treatment are highly significant
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(both p-values < 0.01). We also reject the point prediction of ST that prices equal 30 in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 (p-

value = 0.031); we fail to reject an average price of 60 in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 (p-value = 0.563). There is no

significant difference in prices between the two non-zero retainage treatments, although prices
are more variable when 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. Thus, the aggregate price data supports the price differences
of BM outlined in Hypothesis 2, but rejects the rank ordering of ST.

Result 2. Retainage provisions inflate tender prices.

Results 1 and 2 underscore the potential for retainage to have an anti-competitive effect

on the procurement process. The flip side is that retainage significantly improves average quality

levels. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0, low quality is chosen by the seller in 93.9% of transactions. We fail to reject the

null that trade efficiency attained its Nash equilibrium level of 12.5% (p-value = 0.31). In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5,

the proportion of transactions associated with high quality is 30.2%, and in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 it is 50.4%.

The difference in quality levels between the non-zero retainage treatments is significant at the

10% level (p-value = 0.093) and is consistent with the prediction of BM that, conditional on
attracting seller bids, trade in the high retainage arrangement is more likely to be of high quality.

The quality choice frequencies in these treatments generate significant trade efficiency gains

relative to 𝜌𝜌 = 0 (both p-values < 0.01). As stated in Hypothesis 3, such an improvement can be
rationalized only by BM.

Result 3a. Retainage mitigates the seller moral hazard problem and increases trade efficiency.

Due to the observed market unraveling, global efficiency in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 is 10 percentage

points lower than trade efficiency and is not significantly higher than in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 (p-value = 0.589).

To further investigate the trade-off between the seller’s quality and participation decisions, in
Figure 3 we plot a time series of the market unraveling complement and trade efficiency across

the 30 periods in our experiment. The trend differences in trade efficiency are pronounced. In

𝜌𝜌 = 0, trade efficiency fluctuates about its Nash equilibrium level within the 0-25% interval. In

𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, trade efficiency fluctuates within the 25-50% interval. In both treatments, the variability
of trade efficiency declines over time, while the market never unravels.
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Figure 3. Decomposition of market unraveling and trade efficiency over time.

Notes: Based on 18 matching groups per treatment in a period. Unraveling Complement is
one minus the proportion of auctions which failed to attract a single bidder. Trade efficiency
is a measure of surplus realized divided by surplus made available.

Most interesting is 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, in which trade efficiency begins in the 25-50% interval then

trends consistently upwards over time. By the end of the session and notwithstanding an endgame effect, nearly all transactions that take place are of high quality, which as we observed in
Figure 2 (right panel) is a direct prediction of BM. Meanwhile, after period five, there is a marked

fall in the number of auctions attracting at least one bidder. This trend continues into the final

period, at which point around half of markets unraveled. Notably, in the second half of the
experiment, the difference in global efficiency between 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 is not significant at

conventional levels (p-value = 0.13). On the other hand, global efficiency remains significantly

higher in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 than in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 after period 15 (p-value = 0.015).

Result 3b. High retainage structures undermine global efficiency.

In the online supplementary materials, we present relative frequencies of trade by price

and quality, conditional on at least one bid submitted and buyer acceptance. More than 85% of
transactions in 𝜌𝜌 = 0 are recorded in the 30-39 interval and the quality of these transactions is

near-uniformly low. Most transactions in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 fall into the interval 50-69, with low quality
most commonly observed at prices above 60 and high quality more likely at prices below 60. In
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𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, high quality is the majority choice for sellers at prices above 50. These patterns offer
further indirect evidence to support BM.

Turning to Hypothesis 4, we reject the null of independence between the quality level and

the buyer’s retainage return predicted by ST, in favor of the positive relationship predicted by BM.

In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, the seller’s probability of receiving a non-zero return is 31% after choosing low quality

and 61.3% after choosing high quality. Buyers in this treatment return just 6.1% in exchange for

low quality and 31.9% of retainage monies in exchange for high quality. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, where the
retainage represents a larger share of the price, return rates are 15.6% and 40.4%, respectively.

The premiums paid for high quality in each treatment are significant (both p-values = 0.031).

Positive reciprocity is evident in the distributions of retainage returns by quality level (see Figure

4). Consistent with our definition of an untrustworthy type offering zero return for low quality,

and only a trustworthy type offering a positive return for high quality, we observe roughly twice
as many zero returns for low quality as for high quality. There is also a greater mass on retainage
return proportions above one-quarter in exchange for high quality.

Result 4. Trustworthy buyers reciprocate high quality with a more generous retainage return.
Figure 4. Distribution of retainage return proportions by quality level.

Notes: Histograms of retainage returns in the experimental treatments. The bin width is 0.1.
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Retainage has implications for the distribution of profits. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0, sellers can maintain a

positive profit and even earn slightly more (4.43) than buyers (2.83) on average, although this

difference is not significant (p-value = 0.156). Buyers gain substantially from the introduction of

retainage. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, sellers earn approximately zero (which would be expected given the market

imbalance) and buyers earn 15.8, a significant profit differential (p-value = 0.031). Sellers fare

significantly worse in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, incurring an average loss of 8.75, suggesting that their trust in the

buyer’s willingness to reciprocate is often misplaced.

Our theoretical analysis is equilibrium-based. To check whether subjects’ learning in the

experiment is an important behavioral factor, we split the dataset into three blocks of 10 periods
and conduct a formal analysis of the differences in decision-making over time. There is some

evidence of learning early on; behavior appears to converge after period 10, with no significant
differences in buyer or seller decisions between the second and third blocks.

To obtain insight into the experiment dynamics, we consider each cohort separately and

plot outcomes per group and period, in relation to the price (Figure 5). The top-left cohort

exemplifies the disciplining power of competition in 𝜌𝜌 = 0. After some early adjustments, sellers

submit bids in the 30-35 interval and choose low quality. The top-right cohort reveals a different

dynamic: sellers attempt to elicit acceptances at prices above the buyer’s value of low quality.

Buyers reject most such attempts. The middle two panels reveal a reverse temporal bidding trend

in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, as sellers learn to adjust their bids upwards to account for retainage monies lost. In

the middle-left cohort, sellers produce low quality, marking up their bids proportional to the
associated cost. In the middle-right cohort, sellers produce high quality and buyers reward this

with a positive return, compensating sellers for the increased delivery cost. The bottom two

panels in the figure highlight variable participation in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. In the bottom-left cohort, sellers

gradually choose not to participate in request for bids. Two-thirds of markets unravel in this

cohort. Sellers in the bottom-right cohort are willing to participate and produce high quality.
Where a buyer fails to reward high quality, the seller’s downside is larger than in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5.

In the online supplementary materials, we discuss individual-level regression analyses

which were conducted to investigate the determinants of buyer and seller decisions in the ex-ante

competitive market and the ex-post trade relationship. In all three treatments, bids exhibit a

positive dependency on the most recently matched competitor’s bid and subjects who traded in
the prior period learn to submit lower bids. Retainage is most effective at mitigating seller-side
moral hazard when the seller has recently received a positive retainage return. In 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, we

also observe a strong positive time trend which appears to capture the withdrawal of less trusting

sellers from the market and suggests that high retainage structures are most effective at inducing
high quality once trust is established in the market.
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Figure 5. Representative cohort outcomes over time.

Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment and
cohort. An open triangle is an instance of market unraveling, in which neither seller
submitted a bid. A cross is a transaction failure, in which a buyer rejected the winning bid.
A solid circle is an accepted winning bid at which the seller produced low quality. A solid
square is an accepted winning bid at which the seller produced high quality. An open circle
(square) are the corresponding total payments in instances where these differ from the
winning bid. In such instances, the vertical arrows represent the price-payment differential.

25

5. Behavioral Model Estimation
The findings in the previous section suggest that our model of fair payment norms can

organize the data reasonably well. In the theoretical analysis, we defined the buyer’s type on her

preferred retainage return for high quality. A crude look at the individual-level return data after
period 10 supports the existence of different buyer types in the experiment. Across the pooled
retainage data, 18 out of 36 buyers either returned zero or made a partial retainage return in

exchange for high quality which resulted in the seller incurring a loss. This increases to 28 out of
36 in exchange for low quality, which suggests that buyers exhibit positive reciprocity in the

experiment and provides some empirical justification for our assumption that trustworthy
buyers reward only high quality. Moreover, 15 buyers always returned some positive retainage

return proportion to the seller in exchange for high quality, with mean returns among these
subjects often exceeding 50% of the retainage amount.
5.1

Logit choice framework

We proceed to conduct a maximum likelihood estimation of our behavioral model’s

parameters in a logit choice framework. The probability that seller 𝑖𝑖 chooses high quality in
period 𝑡𝑡 conditional on price 𝑝𝑝 and retainage 𝜌𝜌 is:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ) =

𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆∙∆𝑈𝑈
,
1 + 𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆∙∆𝑈𝑈

(2)

where ∆𝑈𝑈 = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 ; 𝛾𝛾)𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 ), and 𝜆𝜆 is the rationality parameter, inversely related

to the level of decision error (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). For the trust parameter, we specify:
𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌=0.75 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌=0.75 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

(3)

where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌=0.75 is a dummy variable for random assignment to 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, which captures level and
trend differences between our retainage treatments. We restrict 𝛾𝛾 > 0 by transforming 𝛾𝛾� = ln(𝛾𝛾)

to keep the optimization problem unconstrained. The marginal likelihood of the choice sequence
of seller 𝑖𝑖 is given by:

𝑇𝑇

𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = �[𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 )]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 )]1−𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
𝑡𝑡=1

(4)

The subject likelihood contributions are then logged and summed to obtain the sample log-

likelihood function. We cluster robust standard errors at the subject level. Based on a statistical

learning analysis, we drop observations from the first block of 10 periods to mitigate issues of
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serial correlation (Davis 2015, p 334). 23 This leaves us with 573 transactions across the two

treatments, of which 322 are from 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 and 251 are from 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 . The results of this
estimation procedure are presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 4.

Table 4 – Results of the structural estimation.
𝛼𝛼

Constant (𝛼𝛼0 )

Baseline
(1)

𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 (𝛼𝛼1 )
Period (𝛼𝛼2 )

BM1
(2)

BM2
(3)

BM3
(4)

0.312***
(0.019)

0.392***
(0.024)
-0.170***
(0.038)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.005*
(0.002)

0.345***
(0.031)
-0.156*
(0.061)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.007+
(0.004)

1.489***
(0.195)
0.820***
(0.204)
No
No
638.42
664.53
-313.21
573
(67)

1.222***
(0.000)
0.662***
(0.174)
0.094**
(0.030)
Yes
No
548.25
578.70
-267.12
573
(67)

Period * 0.75 (𝛼𝛼3 )

Female
Age

𝛾𝛾
𝜆𝜆

0.019
(0.020)

1.297***
(0.291)
0.452***
(0.076)

Trust random effect
Control variables1
AIC
BIC
Log Likelihood
Observations
(Clusters)

No
No
791.44
795.79
-394.72
573
(67)

No
No
661.58
674.63
-327.79
573
(67)

𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

BM4
(5)

0.380***
(0.098)
-0.177**
(0.064)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.007+
(0.004)
0.091*
(0.036)
-0.004+
(0.002)
1.222***
(0.000)
0.694***
(0.176)
0.075**
(0.025)
Yes
Yes
509.02
581.40
-237.5
522
(62)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01,
* p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. Models in columns (1) to (3) are estimated using maximum likelihood. Models
in columns (4) and (5) are estimated using maximum simulated likelihood.
1 Additional control variables (not reported in the table) are self-reported risk and trust indices,
dummies for female and economics or business major, nationality, and income rank (coefficient
estimates available on request). The number of observations in model (5) is lower due to missing
responses in the questionnaire.

First, we consider the standard theory (Baseline) in which we restrict the behavioral

model parameters to equal zero. The standard theory does not explain the data well, with low

seller rationality and an estimated value for 𝜆𝜆 not significantly different from zero (all errors).

Then, we estimate the constant parameters of our behavioral model (BM1). The parameter
23

The results are qualitatively unchanged by including the full dataset.
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estimates suggest that on average, sellers believe that there is a one-in-three chance of

encountering a trustworthy buyer and that the fair reference point yields the buyer
approximately 1.3 times the seller’s profit. The 95% confidence interval for our 𝛾𝛾 estimate

includes equal profit-sharing. The 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 parameter estimates are significantly different from

zero (both p-values < 0.001) and rationality increases. The behavioral model overwhelmingly

outperforms the baseline when comparing the log-likelihood, AIC and BIC values and based on
the results from a nested likelihood ratio test (𝜒𝜒 2 = 133.86, p-value < 0.001).

Next, we re-estimate the behavioral model and allow 𝛼𝛼 to vary as a function of the

retainage level and over time (BM2). 24 In this specification, trust starts off higher in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, with

sellers assigning 39% probability of encountering a trustworthy buyer. The results reinforce our

earlier observation that trust increases over time in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 , with a significant positive

interaction between the treatment dummy and the time trend (p-value < 0.01). By contrast, there
is some evidence of a fall in trust over time in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, although this effect is statistically weak (p-

value = 0.064). Thus, whereas trust is initially lower in the high retainage treatment, the trust

differential disappears over time on average. This provides a behavioral explanation for our
earlier observation that trade efficiency builds over time in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment (see Figure 3).

The fair reference point is estimated at 1.3 to 1.5 times the seller’s profit, although the confidence

intervals between BM1 and BM2 overlap. Seller rationality in this specification is not significantly
below one. We prefer BM2 based on all statistical comparisons (𝜒𝜒 2 = 29.16, p-value < 0.001).

5.2

Endogenous selection effects

A potential confound in the above analysis are endogenous selection effects which may

bias the estimation results. For example, sellers with higher trust, and by implication a greater
expectation that high quality will be rewarded with a positive retainage return, may submit a

lower bid in the auction. As a result, the estimated 𝛼𝛼 using the quality choice data may be higher

than the true 𝛼𝛼 among all sellers. Using binomial and runs tests, we find statistical support for

this conjecture (see the online supplementary materials for details).

To mitigate the endogeneity issue, we augment equation (3) as follows:
𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌=0.75 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜌𝜌=0.75 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ,

(5)

where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observed subject-level characteristics elicited in the post-experiment

questionnaire, which includes self-reported risk and generalized trust attitudes, dummies for
female, economics or business major, nationality, age, and income rank; and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is a subject-level
We also consider a specification in which the fair reference point 𝛾𝛾 is permitted to vary between
treatments. We find no significant improvement in predictive power over the nested random effects model
and so we maintain the assumption of a common reference point (𝜒𝜒 2 = 0.23, p-value = 0.632).
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random effect term which captures unobserved heterogeneity in trust levels, which we assume
to be independent of the error term and of the observable characteristics, with a normal

distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 . The revised subject likelihood function is given by:
∞

𝑇𝑇

𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = � ��[𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 )]𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 )]1−𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝑔𝑔(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 )𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ,
−∞ 𝑡𝑡=1

(6)

where approximation of the integral with respect to the normally distributed variate is performed
using maximum simulated likelihood.

The results of this estimation procedure are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.

In model BM3, we include the subject-specific random effect but not the control variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 .

Accounting for unobserved seller heterogeneity in this way delivers a significant improvement in

goodness-of-fit based on both AIC and BIC selection criteria. In Figure 6, we present the posterior
random effect 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 for each subject in relation to the frequency of high-quality choices. This

captures residual individual-level variability in trust levels. Those sellers who choose high quality
more frequently are characterized by a significantly larger unobserved trust component, i.e., a

larger positive deviation of the individual-level trust parameter from the population-level trust
parameter. 25 In model BM4, we include the additional control variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . 26 The results

suggest some further improvement in model fit based on the AIC but not the BIC measure, which

reflects the higher penalty for over-fitting in the latter. We also find that trust is significantly
higher among female subjects (p-value < 0.011) and (statistically weak) evidence that trust is
lower among older subjects (p-value = 0.083) subjects.

In both models, our parameter estimates of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 are robust to – and qualitatively

unchanged by – controlling for unobserved and observed individual variability. We caution that
the estimates should be interpreted as upper bounds on the sellers’ degree of trust and beliefs

about fairness in the experiment because these estimates are inferred from the conditional

(rather than unconditional) distribution of bids and quality. This is a limitation of our estimation

approach. The conditional distribution is, however, the distribution typically observed
empirically. It is also the distribution of most practical relevance for the performance of the
retainage mechanism: retainage is only withheld from those suppliers who win the contract.

We also find a small and significant negative correlation between 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and bids.
Only gender and age are found to have a statistically significant effect on trust and so the other control
variables are not discussed further. It may seem surprising that trust and risk attitudes do not influence
the 𝛼𝛼 estimate. However, the generalized trust and risk measures elicited in the post-experiment
questionnaire are non-incentivized. Moreover, Choi et al. (2020) suggest that generalized trust does not
significantly predict specific trust behaviors. A correlation between attitudinal and behavioral measures of
trust typically relies on them measuring the same target and context, which is not the case here.
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Figure 6. Deviation of seller-level trust from population-level trust as a function of quality.

5.3

Notes: The scatterplot (with line of best fit) presents subject-specific estimates of the
posterior trust random effect 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 against the relative frequency of high quality. Line of best
fit: 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = −0.076 + 0.183 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 , where the standard error on the constant term is 0.008, the
standard error on 𝑞𝑞 𝐻𝐻 is 0.014, the model F-stat is 159.91 and the R2 is 71.1%. Five subjects
in a seller role did not win an auction in the last 20 periods and so are excluded.

Discussion

The behavioral model estimation implies that seller trust in our experiment was between

𝛼𝛼 = 0.3 and 0.4, and varied depending on the subject, period, and treatment; the fairness norm,

common to both treatments, was estimated at between 𝛾𝛾 = 1.2 and 1.5. We benchmark
these estimates against prior studies. Using a least absolute deviation approach, Bolton and

Ockenfels (2000) estimate 𝛼𝛼 = 0.50 in the gift-exchange game of Fehr et al. (1993) and 𝛼𝛼 = 0.42
in the trust game of Berg et al. (1995). We obtain very similar estimates for 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 when using a

comparable least absolute deviation approach on the observable profit data. The structure of our

ex-post bilateral trade relationship is closer to the trust game and our estimate of 𝛼𝛼 reflects this.

Our estimate of 𝛾𝛾 implies that a fair outcome allocates the buyer more than half of the transaction
profits. Thus, the market imbalance appears to work in the buyer’s favor.

It is interesting to infer what our parameter estimates imply for the optimal retainage

level, as formulated in the equilibrium analysis. In Figure 7, we depict equilibrium outcomes in
the (𝛼𝛼, 𝜌𝜌) space, given a fairness norm of 𝛾𝛾 = 1.35, the midpoint across our model estimates. The

retainage levels that correspond to our three experimental treatments are each marked on the
figure with a red square. At 𝜌𝜌 = 0, low quality is the only implementable outcome, and this was

corroborated behaviorally in the experiment. At 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5, our upper bound estimate of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.4
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lies on the threshold over which high quality is an implementable seller strategy. The equilibrium
bid at this coordinate (59) is very close to the mean price observed in the data (57.8).

Figure 7. Implementable retainage levels supported by the behavioral model estimation.

Notes: The figure displays equilibrium seller bidding strategies in (𝛼𝛼, 𝜌𝜌) space for 𝛾𝛾 = 1.35,
the midpoint estimate from Table 4. All computations are based on the following cost and
valuation parameter values: 𝑐𝑐 𝐿𝐿 = 0.30, 𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻 = 0.40, 𝑣𝑣 𝐿𝐿 = 0.35 and 𝑣𝑣 𝐻𝐻 = 0.80. The numbers
inside the shapes are the equilibrium bid amounts associated with the indicated quality
level. The empty regions indicate market unraveling. The red squares indicate our
experimental control on 𝜌𝜌. Bids are discrete with minimum increment 0.01, which reflects
the experimental implementation.

To examine the predictive power of our model for bidding strategies in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5

treatment, in Figure 8 we present actual and predicted price and quality based on the individuallevel estimates of our behavioral model parameters. The estimated model fits the data closely. At

𝜌𝜌 = 0.75, the level of trust required to implement high quality is 0.55, greater than our estimate

from the data. Thus, while our behavioral model can explain the increased market unraveling in
this treatment, it cannot explain why the remaining sellers prefer to enter the market. There are

two possible sources for the failure of our behavioral model to successfully predict price and

quality outcomes in the high retainage treatment: (i) sellers’ subjective beliefs are biased; or (ii)
the model estimates of the sellers’ beliefs are biased.
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Figure 8. Actual and predicted price and quality levels in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 treatment.

Notes: Actual and predicted seller price and quality decisions over the last twenty periods
of the experiment, based on 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 estimates from model BM3.

To provide insight into the source of predictive failure, in Figure 9 we compute predicted

retainage return proportions under the assumption that sellers’ beliefs about buyer types

correspond to objective probabilities. Whereas in 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5 (top panel), expected retainage returns

closely track actual returns, there is a noticeable gap between expectations and actual returns in

𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. On average, buyers return more than expected by sellers based on the behavioral model
estimates., which may have encouraged sellers to bid for the contract more often than an objective

assessment of the expected return would warrant. This provides some evidence to suggest that
sellers’ subjective beliefs are biased in this treatment. We cannot, however, rule out that this
difference is due to model bias in our estimates of sellers’ beliefs.
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Figure 9. Actual and predicted retainage return proportions by treatment.

Notes: Actual and predicted buyer retainage return proportions over the last twenty periods
of the experiment, based on 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 estimates from model BM3.

6. Concluding Remarks
The managerial literature has devoted substantial attention to how auction institution

design can improve procurement efficiency. In competitive procurement, standard principal-

agent models show that high product quality equilibria do not exist due to moral hazard. Thus,
we see preferences among procurers for repeat purchases from a smaller group of certified

suppliers and the establishment of reputational mechanisms. The benefits of procurement

mechanisms that permit buyers to incorporate aspects other than price in their decisions have
been discussed in detail (see, e.g., Englebrecht-Wiggans et al. 2007). The identification of
alternative incentive mechanisms that can reap the benefits of price competition while sustaining
cooperation is of considerable managerial value.

We provide experimental evidence that retainage significantly increases the probability

of high-quality project delivery relative to the benchmark zero retainage case. This is consistent
with the observation of Fugger, Katok and Wambach (2019) that price-based auctions perform

poorly with fixed-price contracts when there exists seller-side moral hazard. There is a trade-off

between trade efficiency and transaction fairness, due to the difficulty in sustaining trustworthy
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buyer payment behavior over time. When sellers are engaged without payment guarantee on
production costs, we observe a marked unraveling in markets over time, which softens price

competition. This reduces overall procurement efficiency, despite the higher quality of
transactions remaining in the market.

We contribute two new managerial insights. First, retainage is an effective incentive

mechanism to mitigate the seller-side moral hazard problem so long as suppliers are optimistic
enough in their belief about interacting with a trustworthy buyer; in other words, if they have
sufficient trust in the procurement relationship. An implication is that procurement managers

may benefit from fostering trust with potential suppliers during bidding while letting the price

mechanism allocate the contract. Such interventions may be low cost (e.g., increasing

transparency of the tender process) and circumvent concerns about collusive behavior that can
arise in buyer-determined selection processes (Fugger et al. 2016).

Second, confronted with the real business risk of encountering payment malpractice in

the supply chain, retainage structures are liable to inflate tender prices and deter participation in
the contracting process. The deductibility of retainage through the supply chain is likely to

amplify these effects. Policymakers might consider regulations to increase confidence in the

safeguarding and release of retainage monies withheld, for example via a protected deposit
scheme. The introduction of an arbitration scheme to resolve payment disputes between buyers

and suppliers has recently been debated in the UK parliament. 27 A related problem arises in the

context of late payments, of which retainage monies are a case in point; regulatory penalties for

reneging on agreed payment terms may have beneficial horizontal effects (see Walker and
Hyndman 2021).

Further clarification as to the generalizability of our findings and conceptual

simplifications is in order. First, our experimental setup excludes repeated interactions. This

assumption is not necessarily violated in practice. We provide qualitative evidence in Section 2
that the UK construction supply chain is fragmented and that one-shot interactions are common.
In this scenario, retainage may act as a substitute for reputational capital in the production of high

quality. Moreover, there is an important methodological reason to make this assumption: it
permits us to isolate the effect of retainage on issues of moral hazard without reputational

confounds embodied in field data. Since the availability of reputational information is only likely
to mitigate the seller-side moral hazard (see, e.g., Brosig-Koch and Heinrich 2014), our estimate
as to the effectiveness of retainage is conservative. That is, reputational information may be used

to materially complement the retainage contract. Determining whether retainage can be used to
dominate reputational capital is beyond the scope of our study.
27

https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/constructionretentiondepositschemes.html.
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Second, to ensure saliency of the trade-offs, our three experimental treatments map to

somewhat “extreme” trust arrangements. That is, they span the buyer – seller trust space, rather

than capturing exact contract parameters. This caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting

our results. A numerical example demonstrated that similar inferences apply to low retainage

provisions, in the range observed empirically in construction contracts. We do not claim that our
high retainage treatment replicates a “letter of intent” type agreement as practiced; it does,

however, capture the risk of payment at a level below sunk cost, due to legal vagaries of the
agreement. Such incomplete contracting arrangements leave the supplier vulnerable to a “hold-

up problem” which has broader application in supply chains characterized by relationshipspecific investments (Haruvy et al. 2019).

Our behavioral model offers further insights into how to design retainage incentives. If

high trust levels have been built up over time in the industry, then engaging suppliers based
partially on intent may be an effective strategy to keep projects on schedule. If trust levels are low,

agreeing a formal contract with retainage provision before initiating works is preferable. Factors

determining trust attitudes and behaviors should be considered here. Exogenous market
uncertainty, for example in the buyer’s value, can affect beliefs about trustworthiness (Özer et al.

2011). Competition among buyers may reduce trustworthy behaviors (Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016).

Özer and Zheng (2019) also emphasize that the target and context of trust matter. Perceptions of

trust in a specific managerial network may substitute for generalized trust in supply chain
interactions (Choi et al. 2020).

Practitioners should remain cognizant of prevailing industry norms. Trust and

trustworthiness may be easier to facilitate in small pools of suppliers engaged in repeated
interactions, in which case our estimates for the impact of retainage on transaction efficiency are

conservative. Higher trust has been observed in collectivist societies (e.g., in China) when there

is the prospect of long-term supply chain relationships, but it may be reduced in cross-border

transactions if in-group bias emerges (Özer et al. 2014). Investigating cross-cultural differences

in transaction norms would be an interesting avenue for further work. Consideration could also

be given to the buyer’s payment record in the procurement process. Sellers may trust more in
those buyers who have previously proved themselves to be trustworthy payers.

A further implication of our analysis is that, with retainage, the first-order efficiency

problem becomes a second-order distributional problem. Future research might therefore also

examine the effects of incorporating dispute resolution into the setup. A limitation of our setup is

that sellers are endowed with no bargaining power after the auction and cannot dispute the
buyer’s retainage return decision. In a consumer setting, Andreoni (2018) observes that some

legal enforcement is required to induce buyer trust when goods are sold with a “satisfaction
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guarantee”. Nevertheless, formal litigation is often costly and alternative dispute mechanisms
under-developed.

The type of incentives examined in this study are a feature of performance bonuses in

principal-agent relationships more generally. Employment contracts often contain a fixed base
payment, with the promise of discretionary rewards in the future (see also Fehr et al. 2007, Lee
et al. 2018). In certain industries, such as finance or professional sports, these voluntary bonus

payments may be the most lucrative part of the compensation package. A similar mechanism is

used in the rental housing market by landlords, who withhold deposits as a percentage of the total
rental price – typically amounting to one- or two-month’s rent – to incentivize tenants to take

good care of their property. 28 When there is an excess supply of agents, the motivating effects of

performance bonuses are not obvious (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). We provide evidence

from a competitive bidding environment to suggest that implicit incentives can help mitigate the
moral hazard problem, under such conditions of market imbalance.

Finally, an open question is the extent to which models of fairness, originally developed

to explain personal exchanges, apply to the more impersonal setting of firm decision-making. We
find that deriving common thresholds as to the likelihood of a buyer or seller in the market acting
in good faith is a useful one. We acknowledge, however, that in repeated interactions the
reference point may be path dependent. This possibility is not captured by our static equilibrium
model and is a productive avenue for further theoretical and empirical work.

Arrangements to pay “half now, half later” are also popular with criminal and gangster organizations, at
least as portrayed in the movies.
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Experimental instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. If you read these instructions carefully and make good
decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. The amount of money you earn will

depend on both your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The currency unit in this
experiment is called Experimental Currency Unit, or ECU for short. At the end of the session, you

will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. Upon completion, your total earnings from the
experiment will be displayed on the screen, including your participation fee of $5, and be paid to
you in private and in cash.
How you earn money

For today’s session, one-third of you will be randomly assigned a Buyer role, and two-thirds of

you assigned a Seller role. You will see your role at the start of the session and this role will not
change for the duration of the session. This experiment will include 30 rounds. In each round a
Buyer is matched with two Sellers. The Buyer can purchase a product from one of the two Sellers.

The value of the product to the Buyer, and the cost that the Seller incurs to provide the product,
depends on the Seller choice to deliver a High or Low Quality product, as follows:
Buyer Value
Seller Cost

Low Quality

High Quality

30

40

35

80

Each player will start each round with 7 ECU. Therefore, when there is a transaction between a
Buyer and a Seller,
•

•

The Buyer earns: 7 + Profit, where Profit = Buyer Value – Payment to the Seller
The Seller earns: 7 + Profit, where Profit = Payment to the Seller – Seller Cost

How a potential Seller is determined

An auction is used to select which of the two Sellers will have the opportunity to transact with the
Buyer. At the start of each round, each Seller privately submits a bid for a price at which they
would be willing to deliver the product or elects not to participate in the current round’s auction.
The Seller submitting the lower bid wins the opportunity to potentially trade with the Buyer. In

the event of a tie, the computer will choose the winner at random. Bids can be integers from 30
to 80.
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Example:
Seller A bids 35 and Seller B bids 62 = A is winner.
Sellers A and B both bid 40 = A and B each have 50% probability of winning.
A Seller who does not win or elects not to participate in the auction earns 7 ECU for the round

(Profit = 0). After the auction, the Buyer is presented the winning bid. The Buyer chooses whether
or not to proceed with the transaction. If the Buyer does not proceed the round ends and all three
parties earn 7 ECU for the round (Profit = 0).

How the payment to the Seller is determined
Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment received the following instructions:

If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives payment equal to his or her bid
amount. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low or High Quality product.
Examples:

•

Suppose the winning bid is 50 and the Seller delivers Low Quality. The round profits for
the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows:
Buyer Profit = 35 – 50 = –15*

•

Seller Profit = 50 – 30 = 20

Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality. The respective profits are:
Buyer Profit = 80 – 50 = 30
Seller Profit = 50 – 40 = 10

*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully.

Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment received the following instructions:

If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 50% of his or her bid amount. This

is called the initial payment. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low or High
Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the product and then chooses how much of

the remaining 50% of the winning auction bid is paid to the Seller. This amount is called the
deferred payment. The Buyer keeps any portion of the remaining 50% of the bid not paid to the
seller.
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Examples:
•

Suppose the winning bid is 50, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer sets the

deferred payment at 6. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows:
Buyer Profit = 35 – 25 – 6 = 4

•

Seller Profit = 25 – 30 + 6 = 1

Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred
payment at 6. The respective profits are:
Buyer Profit = 80 – 25 – 6 = 49

•

Seller Profit = 25 – 40 + 6 = –9*

Now Suppose the winning bid is 70, the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer sets
the deferred payment at 30. The respective profits are:

Buyer Profit = 80 – 35 – 30 = 15
Seller Profit = 35 – 40 + 30 = 25

*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully.

Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment received the following instructions:

If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 25% of his or her bid amount. This

is called the initial payment. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low or High
Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the product and then chooses how much of

the remaining 75% of the winning auction bid is paid to the Seller. This amount is called the
deferred payment. The Buyer keeps any portion of the remaining 75% of the bid not paid to the
seller.
•

Examples:
Suppose the winning bid is 60, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer sets the

deferred payment at 16. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows:
Buyer Profit = 35 – 15 – 16 = 4

Seller Profit = 15 – 30 + 16 = 1
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•

Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred
payment at 16. The respective profits are:
Buyer Profit = 80 – 15 – 16 = 49

•

Seller Profit = 15 – 40 + 16 = –9*

Now Suppose the winning bid is 72, the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer sets
the deferred payment at 44. The respective profits are:
Buyer Profit = 80 – 18 – 44 = 18
Seller Profit = 18 – 40 + 44 = 22

*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully.
How you will be paid
At the end of the session the earnings from all rounds of the session will be converted to US dollars
at the rate of 20 ECU for $1. These earnings will be added to your $5 participation fee, displayed
on your screen, and paid to you at the end of the session.
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Example experimental interface screenshot for sellers:

Example experimental interface screenshot for buyers:

Note: In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, a slider with random initial value was used to

avoid anchoring bias. A calculator displayed buyer and seller profits for the different available
deferred payments.
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